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- All HBS Web
(525)
- News (70)
- Research (395)
- Events (1)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (137)
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- November 2023
- Article
Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment
By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li and Paul Milgrom
We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare, but have only a zero guarantee when one bidder can invest before... View Details
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li, and Paul Milgrom. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment." Econometrica 91, no. 6 (November 2023): 1969–2003.
- July 2021
- Article
Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms
By: Samuel Antill and Darrell Duffie
We explain how the common practice of size-discovery trade detracts from overall financial market efficiency. At each of a series of size-discovery sessions, traders report their desired trades, generating allocations of the asset and cash that rely on the most recent... View Details
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Price Impact; Size Discovery; Allocative Efficiency; Workup; Dark Pool; Financial Markets; Market Design; Performance Efficiency
Antill, Samuel, and Darrell Duffie. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 4 (July 2021): 1665–1719.
- Research Summary
The Design of Mechanisms and Institutions
Professor Coughlan's research also investigates the design of public policy and collective choice institutions. His research publications have applied game theory, mechanism design, and laboratory experiments to explore incentives and outcomes under alternative legal,... View Details
- 2016
- Working Paper
Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms
By: Michael Luca
Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, creating new markets where none existed. By reducing transaction costs, online marketplaces facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers. One central... View Details
Luca, Michael. "Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 22616, September 2016.
- Article
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design." Review of Economic Studies 53, no. 3 (July 1986): 447–456.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
- June 2024
- Article
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Duke Kominers
Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices, and sometimes for free. Such "non-market" mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents... View Details
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms." Journal of Political Economy 132, no. 6 (June 2024): 1831–1875. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
- March 2022
- Article
Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
Identifying high-growth microentrepreneurs in low-income countries remains a challenge due to a scarcity of verifiable information. With a cash grant experiment in India we demonstrate that community knowledge can help target high-growth microentrepreneurs; while the... View Details
Keywords: Microentrepreneurs; Community Information; Field Experiment; Loans; Entrepreneurship; Developing Countries and Economies; Financing and Loans; Information; Mathematical Methods; India
Hussam, Reshmaan, Natalia Rigol, and Benjamin N. Roth. "Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field." American Economic Review 112, no. 3 (March 2022): 861–898.
(Online Appendix with Corrigendum—Thanks to Isabella Masetto, Diego Ubfal, and The Institute for Replication for identifying a minor coding error in the production of Table 4.)
(Online Appendix with Corrigendum—Thanks to Isabella Masetto, Diego Ubfal, and The Institute for Replication for identifying a minor coding error in the production of Table 4.)
- Fall 2024
- Article
Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects
By: Olivier Baum and Guhan Subramanian
We present the first evidence on the incidence of “trip wire” versus “last look” poison pills. Using a hand-collected data set of 130 poison pills implemented and/or amended between January 1, 2020 and March 31, 2023, we find that pills are almost evenly divided... View Details
Baum, Olivier, and Guhan Subramanian. "Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects." Business Lawyer 79, no. 4 (Fall 2024): 1043–1069.
- 03 Mar 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism
- 11 May 2020
- Working Paper Summaries
Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
- October 2023
- Article
Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
By: David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of... View Details
Keywords: Refugee Resettlement; Matching; Matching Markets; Matching Platform; Matching With Contracts; Algorithms; Refugees; Market Design
Delacrétaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement." American Economic Review 113, no. 10 (October 2023): 2689–2717.
- March 2008
- Article
Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism,... View Details
Milkman, Katherine L., James Burns, David Parkes, Gregory M. Barron, and Kagan Tumer. "Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism." Special Issue on Theoretical, Empirical and Experimental Research on Auctions. Applied Economics Research Bulletin 2 (March 2008): 106–141. (Earlier version distributed as Harvard Business School Working Paper 08-064.)
- June 2020
- Article
Parallel Play: Startups, Nascent Markets, and the Effective Design of a Business Model
By: Rory McDonald and Kathleen Eisenhardt
Prior research advances several explanations for entrepreneurial success in nascent markets but leaves a key imperative unexplored: the business model. By studying five ventures in the same nascent market, we develop a novel theoretical framework for understanding how... View Details
Keywords: Search; Legitimacy; Organizational Innovation; Organizational Learning; Mechanisms And Processes; Institutional Entrepreneurship; Qualitative Methods; Business Model Design; Business Model; Business Startups; Entrepreneurship; Emerging Markets; Adaptation; Competition; Strategy
McDonald, Rory, and Kathleen Eisenhardt. "Parallel Play: Startups, Nascent Markets, and the Effective Design of a Business Model." Administrative Science Quarterly 65, no. 2 (June 2020): 483–523.
- April 2006
- Background Note
Designing Sustainable Service Models
By: Frances X. Frei
Taught as the second module in a Harvard Business School course on Managing Service Operations. Addresses the challenge of designing service models that effectively incorporate a customer operating role, as well as how to align operations to deliver value to both the... View Details
Keywords: Business Model; Customers; Design; Managerial Roles; Consumer Behavior; Service Operations; Power and Influence; Value
Frei, Frances X. "Designing Sustainable Service Models." Harvard Business School Background Note 606-031, April 2006.
- Oct 2020
- Conference Presentation
Optimal, Truthful, and Private Securities Lending
By: Emily Diana, Michael J. Kearns, Seth Neel and Aaron Leon Roth
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of securities lending in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of identical copies of some scarce resource... View Details
Diana, Emily, Michael J. Kearns, Seth Neel, and Aaron Leon Roth. "Optimal, Truthful, and Private Securities Lending." Paper presented at the 1st Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) International Conference on AI in Finance (ICAIF), October 2020.
- Research Summary
Service Excellence by Design
By: Frances X. Frei
This research addresses how to design sustainable service models that deliver ongoing value to both customers and the firm. In particular, the research reveals three principles of effective service management (see
View Details
- 2015
- Working Paper
Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence
By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers
We show that a mechanism induces an agent to make efficient ex ante investment choices if and only if it rewards that agent with his marginal surplus; additionally, for an ex post efficient mechanism, these properties are equivalent to strategy-proofness for the agent.... View Details
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Investment Efficiency; Providing Marginal Rewards; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms; Mechanism Design; Market Design; Human Capital
Hatfield, John William, Fuhito Kojima, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence." Working Paper, January 2015.
- 2016
- Working Paper
Markets for Ideas: Prize Structure, Entry Limits, and the Design of Ideation Contests
By: Pavel Kireyev
Contests are a popular mechanism for the procurement of innovation. In marketing, design, and other creative industries, firms use freelance marketplaces to organize contests and obtain high-quality ideas for ads, new products, and even business strategies from... View Details
Keywords: Idea Generation; Crowdsourcing; Contest Design; Structural Estimation; Motivation and Incentives; Competition; Innovation and Invention
Kireyev, Pavel. "Markets for Ideas: Prize Structure, Entry Limits, and the Design of Ideation Contests." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-129, May 2016.