Publications

2018
Working Paper

Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts

By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers

In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods

SSRN

June 2025
Article

Collusion in Brokered Markets

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery

High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details

SSRN

Purchase

Research Summary

Prudence in Bargaining

We investigate the outcome of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining game when noise is added to a player’s pay-off. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because... View Details

Research Summary

Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal? (with Fabio Kanczuk)

By: Laura Alfaro

We model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity-term premium, tax smoothing, rolling over risk and the cost from defaulting. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion,... View Details

December 2010
Article

Nominal versus Indexed Debt: A Quantitative Horse Race

By: Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk

The main arguments in favor of and against nominal and indexed debt are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium... View Details

Keywords: Borrowing and Debt; Motivation and Incentives; Inflation and Deflation; System Shocks; Taxation; Risk and Uncertainty; Framework; Problems and Challenges; Interest Rates; Cost; Developing Countries and Economies; Service Operations

2003
Working Paper

Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows

By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Pankaj Ghemawat

This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by... View Details

Keywords: Business Model; Competition; Open Source Distribution; Balance and Stability; Applications and Software; Network Effects; Duopoly and Oligopoly

Research Summary

The Role of Institutions in Overcoming Imperfect Monitoring in Relational Contracting (with Carmit Segal)

In a world in which firms can be hit by transitory adverse shocks it may be too costly for any single worker to verify the true state of the world. In this case, it may not be possible for firms to lower wages in response to adverse shocks and still have the workers... View Details

2020
Working Paper

Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers

By: Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru

This paper studies the impact of the arbitrator selection process on consumer outcomes by examining roughly 9,000 consumer arbitration cases in the securities industry. Securities disputes present a good laboratory: arbitration is mandatory for all disputes,... View Details

Keywords: Arbitration; Financial Advisers; Financial Advisors; Brokers; Consumer Finance; Financial Misconduct; Fraud; Personal Finance; Conflict and Resolution; Information; Fairness

SSRN

Research Summary

Housing Markets with Contingencies

We model a real-estate market with three types of agents: regular buyers and sellers, and homeowners, who are agents who want to sell their current home only if they can buy another one. On the one hand, our model is a counterpart of the Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez... View Details

Research Summary

Capital Controls, Risk and Liberalization Cycles (joint with Fabio Kanczuk)

By: Laura Alfaro

We construct an Overlapping-Generations model where agents vote on whether to open or close the economy to international capital flows. Political decisions are shaped by the risk over capital and labor returns. In an open economy, the capitalists (old) completely hedge... View Details

2014
Working Paper

The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games

By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman

Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first... View Details

Keywords: Strategy; Game Theory

2010
Working Paper

A Behavioral Model of Demandable Deposits and Its Implications for Financial Regulation

By: Julio J. Rotemberg

A model is developed that rationalizes contracts that give depositors the right to obtain funds on demand even when depositors intend to use these funds for consumption in the future. This is explained by depositor overoptimism regarding their own ability to collect... View Details

Keywords: Banks and Banking; Insurance; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Policy; Consumer Behavior; Financial Services Industry

Article

Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property

By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao

Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased threat of... View Details

Keywords: Patents; Management; Innovation and Invention; Knowledge; Rights; Value; Information; Corporate Disclosure

winter 2005
Article

Financing Auction Bids

By: Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and S. Viswanathan

In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay their bid. If bidders have asymmetric cash positions and independent private values then auctions will be inefficient. However, what happens if bidders have access to financial markets? We characterize efficient... View Details

Keywords: Financing and Loans; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Financial Markets; Valuation; Cash; Capital Markets; Profit; Competition

2005
Working Paper

Nominal versus Indexed Debt: A Quantitative Horse Race

By: Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk

The main arguments in favor of and against nominal and indexed debt are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium... View Details

Keywords: Borrowing and Debt; Taxation; Risk and Uncertainty; Inflation and Deflation; System Shocks; Developing Countries and Economies; Mathematical Methods

Research Summary

The Chopstick Auction - An Experimental Study of the Exposure Problem in Auctions (with P. Guillen, L. Llorente, S. Onderstal, R. Sausgruber), 2002

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the "chopstick auction" in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information... View Details

March 2010
Article

Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm

By: Eric J. Van den Steen

This paper develops a theory of the firm in which a firm's centralized asset ownership and low-powered incentives give the manager, as an equilibrium outcome, interpersonal authority over employees (in a world with open disagreement). The paper thus provides... View Details

Keywords: Theory; Assets; Ownership; Motivation and Incentives; Governance Controls; Power and Influence; Projects; Perspective; Employees

Purchase

July 2002
Article

The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting

By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao

Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect... View Details

Keywords: Intellectual Property; Contracts; Strategy; Valuation