Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(333)
- Faculty Publications (127)
- Article
Why Hospitals Don't Learn from Failures: Organizational and Psychological Dynamics That Inhibit System Change
By: A. Tucker and A. Edmondson
The importance of hospitals learning from their failures hardly needs to be stated. Not only are matters of life and death at stake on a daily basis, but also an increasing number of U.S. hospitals are operating in the red. This article reports on in-depth qualitative... View Details
- October 2003
- Article
Capture by Threat
By: Ernesto Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella
We analyze a simple stochastic environment in which policy makers can be threatened by “nasty” interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policy maker’s desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock.... View Details
- 2003
- Working Paper
Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Pankaj Ghemawat
This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by... View Details
- summer 2003
- Article
Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
The patent system encourages innovation and knowledge disclosure by providing exclusivity to inventors. Exclusivity is limited, however, because a substantial fraction of patents have some probability of being ruled invalid when challenged in court. The possibility of... View Details
- July 2002
- Article
The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect... View Details
- 1999
- Working Paper
Using Dyadic Strategies to Outperform Equilibrium Models of Communication in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- 1998
- Working Paper
Outperforming Equilibrium Models of Communication in Bargaining Games
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max Bazerman
- 1996
- Article
Limits on Interest Rate Rules in the IS Model
By: William R. Kerr and Robert G. King
There has been a substantial amount of research on interest rate rules. This literature finds that the feasibility and desirability of interest rate rules depends on the structure of the model used to approximate macroeconomic reality. We employ a series of... View Details
- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation
- May 1992
- Article
Coordination in Split-Award Auctions
By: James J. Anton and Dennis Yao
We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are... View Details
- September 1990
- Article
Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
An economic agent, the incumbent, is operating in many environments at the same time. These may be locations, markets, or specific activities. He is informed of the particular conditions relevant to each situation. His action in each case is observable by another... View Details
- winter 1989
- Article
Split-Awards Procurement and Innovation
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
In many procurement settings, it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers. In this article, we develop a model of split-award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous. We characterize the set of equilibrium bids and... View Details
- February 1988 (Revised November 1994)
- Background Note
Note on Fundamental Parity Conditions
By: W. Carl Kester and Richard P. Melnick
Provides a simple framework for analyzing expected exchange rate movements. Basic parity and equilibrium conditions are presented including purchasing power parity, forward parity, interest rate parity, the domestic Fisher effect, and the international Fisher effect... View Details
- 1986
- Working Paper
Price Competition with a Distribution of Switch Costs and Reservation Prices
By: Jerry R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer
When there is a distribution of switch costs and of reservation prices for a good, and marginal cost of producing the good is zero, equilibrium in pure price strategies may (and sometimes must) exhibit price dispersion. Equilibrium may or may not exist, and there may... View Details
- January 1985
- Article
A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
By: A. E. Roth