Publications
Publications
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(283)
- Faculty Publications (104)
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-season College Football Bowls
By: Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Many markets have "unraveled" and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. However, it has previously proved difficult to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to... View Details
- June 2008
- Case
Kidney Matchmakers
By: Brian J. Hall and Nicole Bennett
In this case we look at the design and development of an unconventional market, where neither money nor traditional "goods" are exchanged. Kidney exchange is an idea pioneered by HBS professor and market designer Alvin Roth and a small group of innovative doctors. This... View Details
- June 2008
- Article
Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?
By: Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu
Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were... View Details
- March 2008
- Article
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details
Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)
- March 2008
- Article
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
By: Alvin E. Roth
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details
Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety
- 2008
- Chapter
Matching and Market Design
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details
- winter 2007
- Article
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls
By: Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
- October 2007
- Article
The Art of Designing Markets
By: Alvin E. Roth
Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by... View Details
- 2007
- Working Paper
The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
- 2007
- Working Paper
What Have We Learned From Market Design?
By: Alvin E. Roth
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details
- 2007
- Working Paper
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details
- 2007
- Working Paper
The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner and Alvin E. Roth
In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast,... View Details
- May 2007
- Article
Multi-agent Learning and the Descriptive Value of Simple Models
By: Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Value
- 2007
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Alvin E. Roth
- Article
The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner and Alvin E. Roth
- September 2006
- Article
Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
By: Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Alvin E. Roth
- September 2006
- Article
The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
By: Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Alvin E. Roth
In an experiment, players ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoners dilemma was substantially diminished when the payoffs were noisy, even though players could monitor one anothers past actions perfectly. In contrast, in one-time play against a succession... View Details
- 2006
- Chapter
Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration
By: J. Keith Murnighan and Alvin E. Roth
- May 2006
- Article
Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
By: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth