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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(2,368)
- People (2)
- News (454)
- Research (1,574)
- Events (15)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (813)
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- September–October 2012
- Article
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: Robert Gibbons and Rebecca Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Gibbons, Robert, and Rebecca Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Organization Science 23, no. 5 (September–October 2012): 1350–1364.
- Article
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
By: Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun
We combine unique administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data include manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious model of... View Details
Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics 33, no. 3 (July 2015): 623–681.
- August 2021 (Revised August 2023)
- Case
Launching Casabe: Matching a Founder's Vision with Growth Capital
By: Emily R. McComb
McComb, Emily R. "Launching Casabe: Matching a Founder's Vision with Growth Capital." Harvard Business School Case 222-031, August 2021. (Revised August 2023.)
- Research Summary
Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting
Joint work with Giacinta Cestone, Institut d'Analisi Economica, Barcelona
This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and... View Details
- 14 Feb 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Keywords: by R. Gibbons & R. Henderson
- November 2003 (Revised September 2021)
- Case
Ivar Kreuger and the Swedish Match Empire
By: Geoffrey Jones and Ingrid Vargas
Taught in Evolution of Global Business. Globalization and corporate fraud are the central themes of this case on the international growth of Swedish Match in the interwar years. Between 1913 and 1932, Ivar Kreuger, known as the "Swedish Match King," built a small,... View Details
Keywords: History; International Finance; Globalized Firms and Management; Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Monopoly; Business and Government Relations; Sweden
Jones, Geoffrey, and Ingrid Vargas. "Ivar Kreuger and the Swedish Match Empire." Harvard Business School Case 804-078, November 2003. (Revised September 2021.)
- June 2013
- Supplement
Multiasistencia: Redefining the Relationship with its Service Professionals. Spreadsheet Supplement
By: Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez
Multiasistencia, a major Spanish BPO of insurance repairs, is changing the relational contract with its service profesionals from a referral model to a guaranteed workload one. View Details
- Research Summary
What Happens when Agents Join Many-to-One Matching Market?
In their seminal book about matching theory, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discuss (among other things) what happens in a one-to-one matching market when a new woman joins it. An elegant result shows that in this scenario there exists a non-empty set of men (related to a... View Details
- 2023
- Working Paper
Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
By: Olivier Darmouni, Simon Essig Aberg and Juha Tolvanen
Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements that specify quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching... View Details
Keywords: Decentralized Markets; Trading Frictions; Market Structure; Transaction Costs; Contracts; Market Transactions; Pulp and Paper Industry
Darmouni, Olivier, Simon Essig Aberg, and Juha Tolvanen. "Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets." Working Paper, December 2023.
- 04 Feb 2009
- Working Paper Summaries
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
Keywords: by Hanna Halaburda
- October 2011 (Revised October 2013)
- Case
A New Financial Policy at Swedish Match
By: Bo Becker and Michael Norris
Swedish Match is a profitable smokeless tobacco company with low debt compared to other firms in its industry. The firm's CFO now wants to revise the firm's conservative financial policy. View Details
Becker, Bo, and Michael Norris. "A New Financial Policy at Swedish Match." Harvard Business School Case 212-017, October 2011. (Revised October 2013.)
- October 2022
- Article
A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts
By: Navid Mojir and K. Sudhir
The paper develops the first structural model of organizational buying to study innovation diffusion in a B2B market. Our model is particularly applicable for routinized exchange relationships, whereby centralized buyers periodically evaluate and choose contracts,... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Buying Behavior; Healthcare Marketing; B2B Markets; B2B Innovation; New Product Diffusion; New Product Adoption; Organizations; Acquisition; Behavior; Health Care and Treatment; Marketing; Innovation and Invention
Mojir, Navid, and K. Sudhir. "A Structural Model of Organizational Buying for Business-to-Business Markets: Innovation Adoption with Share-of-Wallet Contracts." Journal of Marketing Research (JMR) 59, no. 5 (October 2022): 883–907.
- August 2013
- Teaching Note
Multiasistencia: Redefining the Relationship with Its Service Professionals
By: F. Asis Martinez-Jerez
Multiasistencia, a major Spanish BPO of insurance repairs, is changing the relational contract with its service profesionals from a referral model to a guaranteed workload one. View Details
- 22 May 2018
- News
Matching People Looking For Work With Employers Looking For Workers
- Research Summary
Interviewing and Dating in Two-Sided Matching Markets: Coordination and Communication (joint with M. Schwarz)
We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale Shapley (1962) by including a stage of costly information acquisition. Agents do not know their preferences over potential partners unless they choose to conduct... View Details
- Article
Contracting in a Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand and Substitute Products
By: Santiago Kraiselburd, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman
Kraiselburd, Santiago, V.G. Narayanan, and Ananth Raman. "Contracting in a Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand and Substitute Products." Production and Operations Management 13, no. 1 (March 2004).
- October 2008
- Article
Minimally Altruistic Wages and Unemployment in a Matching Model with Monopsony
By: Julio J. Rotemberg
Rotemberg, Julio J. "Minimally Altruistic Wages and Unemployment in a Matching Model with Monopsony." Supplement. Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (October 2008): 97–110.
- 18 Mar 2010
- Working Paper Summaries