Filter Results:
(1,611)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,611)
- People (1)
- News (343)
- Research (1,040)
- Events (18)
- Multimedia (9)
- Faculty Publications (587)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,611)
- People (1)
- News (343)
- Research (1,040)
- Events (18)
- Multimedia (9)
- Faculty Publications (587)
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 1 (February 2012): 176–208.
- Article
Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 275–286.
- April 1984 (Revised December 1986)
- Case
Swedish Match Co. (A)
By: Norman A. Berg and John Young
Keywords: Sweden
Berg, Norman A., and John Young. "Swedish Match Co. (A)." Harvard Business School Case 384-221, April 1984. (Revised December 1986.)
- 2005
- Chapter
Finding the Right Match
By: Christian H.M. Ketels
Ketels, Christian H.M. "Finding the Right Match." In What's Next? Strategic Views on Foreign Direct Investment, edited by Samuel Passow and Magnus Runnbeck, 104–115. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2005.
- 2013
- Dissertation
Firm-to-Firm Matching Along the Global Supply Chain
By: Raluca Dragusanu
This paper examines the matching patterns between buyers and sellers at different stages of the global production chain. I construct a new dataset, which links firm-level information on Indian manufacturing exporters from the CMIE-Prowess database with firm-level... View Details
- April 1984 (Revised December 1985)
- Case
Swedish Match Co. (B)
By: Norman A. Berg and John Young
Keywords: Sweden
Berg, Norman A., and John Young. "Swedish Match Co. (B)." Harvard Business School Case 384-222, April 1984. (Revised December 1985.)
- Research Summary
What Happens when Agents Join Many-to-One Matching Market?
In their seminal book about matching theory, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discuss (among other things) what happens in a one-to-one matching market when a new woman joins it. An elegant result shows that in this scenario there exists a non-empty set of men (related to a... View Details
- October 2011 (Revised October 2013)
- Case
A New Financial Policy at Swedish Match
By: Bo Becker and Michael Norris
Swedish Match is a profitable smokeless tobacco company with low debt compared to other firms in its industry. The firm's CFO now wants to revise the firm's conservative financial policy. View Details
Becker, Bo, and Michael Norris. "A New Financial Policy at Swedish Match." Harvard Business School Case 212-017, October 2011. (Revised October 2013.)
- 15 Feb 2013
- News
A New Matching Market for Dog Buyers
- February 2006
- Teaching Note
Matching Dell: Teaching Note Supplement
By: Jan W. Rivkin
Keywords: Computer Industry
- 01 Jun 2001
- News
A Match Made in Heaven
Back in the 1980s, while working as a high-priced management consultant, Jim Koch (MBA ’74) decided what this country really needed was an exceptional glass of beer. He drained his savings, maxed out his credit cards, and using an old family recipe perfected in his... View Details
- 01 Dec 2020
- News
Finding The Right Patient-Provider Match
second year,” he says. Gardner has built Kyruus into an industry leader in providing search, scheduling, and data management services for health systems. Simplifying the Process “We don’t define what is right for the patients. Our job is to get the data to help you... View Details
Keywords: Susan Young
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 18 Mar 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
- 2013
- Article
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main... View Details
Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (November 2013): 1585–1632.
- 2007
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Alvin E. Roth
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-076, April 2007.
- May 2005
- Article
The Boston Public School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "The Boston Public School Match." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 368–371.
- December 2024
- Article
Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets." Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 9, no. 1 (December 2024): 83–104.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
By: Hanna Halaburda
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-068, November 2008.
- October 2020
- Article
Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets
By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexandru Nichifor
We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side... View Details
Keywords: Size-dependent Discounts; Path-independence; Respect For Improvements; Market Design; Mathematical Methods
Delacretaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexandru Nichifor. "Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets." Journal of Mathematical Economics 90 (October 2020): 127–131.