Publications
Publications
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(185)
- Faculty Publications (72)
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become... View Details
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details
- May 2014
- Article
Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching
By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an illustration of how the design of labor market clearing mechanisms can affect incentives for human capital acquisition. Specifically, we extend the labor market matching model (with discrete transfers) of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to incorporate the... View Details
- 2013
- Article
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main... View Details
- Winter 2013
- Article
The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators and Super-Aggregators
By: Andrei Hagiu and David B. Yoffie
The patent market consists mainly of privately negotiated, bilateral transactions, either sales or cross-licenses, between large companies. There is no eBay, Amazon, New York Stock Exchange, or Kelley's Blue Book equivalent for patents, and when buyers and sellers do... View Details
- Article
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
- Article
Testing Substitutability
By: John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only... View Details
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
- February 2011
- Case
oDesk: Changing How the World Works
By: Boris Groysberg, David A. Thomas and Jennifer M. Tydlaska
It is 2010, and Gary Swart, CEO of oDesk, is contemplating the next steps for his organization. Founded in 2004 in California, oDesk operates an online marketplace which matches Employers with Contractors. oDesk provides fact-based information on Contractors, including... View Details
- 2011
- Working Paper
Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange
By: Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions
By: Alvin E. Roth
This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- 2010
- Chapter
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details
- December 2009
- Article
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details
- 2009
- Chapter
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
- 2009
- Working Paper
'I read Playboy for the Articles': Justifying and Rationalizing Questionable Preferences
By: Zoe Chance and Michael I. Norton
- 2009
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-season College Football Bowls
By: Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Many markets have "unraveled" and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. However, it has previously proved difficult to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to... View Details
- June 2008
- Article
Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?
By: Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu
Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were... View Details