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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,660)
- People (1)
- News (343)
- Research (1,032)
- Events (18)
- Multimedia (9)
- Faculty Publications (586)
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- 2013
- Working Paper
Non-Standard Matches and Charitable Giving
By: Michael Sanders, Sarah Smith and Michael I. Norton
Many organisations, including corporations and governments, wish to encourage charitable giving, and offer incentives for their employees, customers and citizens to do so. The most common of these incentives is a match rate, where the organisation agrees to pay, for... View Details
Sanders, Michael, Sarah Smith, and Michael I. Norton. "Non-Standard Matches and Charitable Giving." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13-094, May 2013.
- 30 May 2013
- Working Paper Summaries
Non-Standard Matches and Charitable Giving
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.
- December 1999 (Revised March 2001)
- Teaching Note
Matching Dell TN
By: Jan W. Rivkin
Teaching Note for (9-799-158). View Details
Keywords: Computer Industry
- Article
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
By: Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun
We combine unique administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data include manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious model of... View Details
Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics 33, no. 3 (July 2015): 623–681.
- May 2014
- Article
Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching
By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an illustration of how the design of labor market clearing mechanisms can affect incentives for human capital acquisition. Specifically, we extend the labor market matching model (with discrete transfers) of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to incorporate the... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Fuhito Kojima, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 104, no. 5 (May 2014): 436–441.
- 1992
- Chapter
Two Sided Matching
By: A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Two Sided Matching." In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, 485–541. Elsevier/North-Holland, 1992.
- 22 May 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
- 2021
- Working Paper
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
By: Sai Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers and David Parkes
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient frontier in this design... View Details
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Deep Learning; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Sai, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers, and David Parkes. "Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching." Working Paper, July 2021.
- November 2003 (Revised September 2021)
- Case
Ivar Kreuger and the Swedish Match Empire
By: Geoffrey Jones and Ingrid Vargas
Taught in Evolution of Global Business. Globalization and corporate fraud are the central themes of this case on the international growth of Swedish Match in the interwar years. Between 1913 and 1932, Ivar Kreuger, known as the "Swedish Match King," built a small,... View Details
Keywords: History; International Finance; Globalized Firms and Management; Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Monopoly; Business and Government Relations; Sweden
Jones, Geoffrey, and Ingrid Vargas. "Ivar Kreuger and the Swedish Match Empire." Harvard Business School Case 804-078, November 2003. (Revised September 2021.)
- January 2016 (Revised November 2018)
- Case
Match Next: Next Generation Middle School?
By: John J-H Kim and Daniel Goldberg
This case is set in 2015 as a team at Match Education, a high performing charter middle school in Boston, explores new staffing and technology approaches in their quest to obtain what they term "jaw dropping" results. The team hopes to test and model for other schools... View Details
Keywords: General Management; K-12; Charter Schools; Public Schools; Edtech; Education; Information Technology; Management; Public Sector; Entrepreneurship; Education Industry; Boston
Kim, John J-H, and Daniel Goldberg. "Match Next: Next Generation Middle School?" Harvard Business School Case 316-138, January 2016. (Revised November 2018.)
- May 2017
- Article
Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments." American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (May 2017): 214–219.
- December 2009
- Article
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Secondary Education; Marketplace Matching; Performance Efficiency; Mathematical Methods; Motivation and Incentives; Strategy; Balance and Stability
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009). (AER links to access the Appendix and Downloadable Data Set.)
- April 1984 (Revised December 1986)
- Case
Swedish Match Co. (A)
By: Norman A. Berg and John Young
Keywords: Sweden
Berg, Norman A., and John Young. "Swedish Match Co. (A)." Harvard Business School Case 384-221, April 1984. (Revised December 1986.)
- January 2004
- Case
Matching Dell (B): 1998-2003
By: Jan W. Rivkin and Simona Giorgi
Supplements the (A) case. View Details
Keywords: Computer Industry
Rivkin, Jan W., and Simona Giorgi. "Matching Dell (B): 1998-2003." Harvard Business School Case 704-476, January 2004.
- 2013
- Dissertation
Firm-to-Firm Matching Along the Global Supply Chain
By: Raluca Dragusanu
This paper examines the matching patterns between buyers and sellers at different stages of the global production chain. I construct a new dataset, which links firm-level information on Indian manufacturing exporters from the CMIE-Prowess database with firm-level... View Details
- Research Summary
What Happens when Agents Join Many-to-One Matching Market?
In their seminal book about matching theory, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discuss (among other things) what happens in a one-to-one matching market when a new woman joins it. An elegant result shows that in this scenario there exists a non-empty set of men (related to a... View Details
- Article
Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 275–286.
- 2005
- Chapter
Finding the Right Match
By: Christian H.M. Ketels
Ketels, Christian H.M. "Finding the Right Match." In What's Next? Strategic Views on Foreign Direct Investment, edited by Samuel Passow and Magnus Runnbeck, 104–115. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2005.