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- All HBS Web (189)
- Faculty Publications (108)
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- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 17 Mar 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions
Keywords: by Alvin E. Roth
- 25 May 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Trust and Disintermediation: Evidence from an Online Freelance Marketplace
- July 2021
- Article
Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms
By: Zoë Cullen and Chiara Farronato
We study the growth of online peer-to-peer markets. Using data from TaskRabbit, an expanding marketplace for domestic tasks at the time of our study, we show that growth varies considerably across cities. To disentangle the potential drivers of growth, we look... View Details
Keywords: Two-sided Market; Two-sided Platforms; Peer-to-peer Markets; Platform Strategy; Sharing Economy; Platform Growth; Internet and the Web; Digital Platforms; Strategy; Market Design; Network Effects
Cullen, Zoë, and Chiara Farronato. "Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms." Management Science 67, no. 7 (July 2021): 3985–4003.
- December 2024
- Article
Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets." Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 9, no. 1 (December 2024): 83–104.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
By: Hanna Halaburda
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-068, November 2008.
- January 8, 2025
- Article
Why Retailers Are Turning to Third-Party Marketplaces
By: Antonio Moreno
Some traditional retailers—including Walmart, Target, and Best Buy—are adopting third-party marketplaces, which connect customers with external sellers and thereby offer customers a much broader selection. Many other traditional retailers are considering whether to... View Details
Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Distribution Channels; Customer Focus and Relationships; Cost vs Benefits; Retail Industry
Moreno, Antonio. "Why Retailers Are Turning to Third-Party Marketplaces." Harvard Business Review Digital Articles (January 8, 2025).
- Article
An Invitation to Market Design
By: Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym and Vincent P. Crawford
Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the infrastructure that enables those transactions to take place, market designers can... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Trading; Scrip; Liquidity; Efficiency; Equity; Allocation Rules; Marketplaces; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Auctions
Kominers, Scott Duke, Alexander Teytelboym, and Vincent P. Crawford. "An Invitation to Market Design." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 541–571.
- January 2018 (Revised February 2018)
- Technical Note
Making Markets
Explains how to identify and capitalize on marketplace design opportunities. Defines markets and marketplaces and describes the basic functions of each. Discusses attributes (e.g., heterogeneity of participants' preferences and asymmetry in available information) that... View Details
Keywords: Marketplaces; Two-Sided Markets; Entrepreneurship; Market Design; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Market Entry and Exit; Digital Platforms; Auctions
Eisenmann, Thomas R., and Scott Duke Kominers. "Making Markets." Harvard Business School Technical Note 818-096, January 2018. (Revised February 2018.)
- June 2008
- Article
Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?
By: Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu
Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were... View Details
Keywords: Medical Specialties; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Employment; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Health Industry
Harner, Christopher D., Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa, and Serena S. Hu. "Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?" Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery: American Volume 90 (June 2008): 1375–1384.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other... View Details
Ashlagi, Itai, and Flip Klijn. "Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-111, June 2010.
- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Hidden Substitutes." Working Paper, September 2014.
- August 2020
- Article
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Social Choice and Welfare 55, no. 2 (August 2020): 215–228.
- September 2019
- Article
Optimizing Reserves in School Choice: A Dynamic Programming Approach
By: Franklyn Wang, Ravi Jagadeesan and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a new model of school choice with reserves in which a social planner is constrained by a limited supply of reserve seats and tries to find an optimal matching according to a social welfare function. We construct the optimal distribution of reserves via a... View Details
Wang, Franklyn, Ravi Jagadeesan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Optimizing Reserves in School Choice: A Dynamic Programming Approach." Operations Research Letters 47, no. 5 (September 2019): 438–446.
- 2017
- Working Paper
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-055, January 2018.
- 2016
- Article
Peer-to-Peer Markets
By: Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato and Jonathan Levin
Peer-to-peer markets such as eBay, Uber, and Airbnb allow small suppliers to compete with traditional providers of goods or services. We view the primary function of these markets as making it easy for buyers to find sellers and engage in convenient, trustworthy... View Details
Keywords: Peer-to-peer; Online Platforms; Matching; Innovation; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Market Design; Internet and the Web; Technology Adoption; Network Effects; Market Entry and Exit
Einav, Liran, Chiara Farronato, and Jonathan Levin. "Peer-to-Peer Markets." Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016): 615–635.
- 2013
- Working Paper
Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms
By: Hanna Halaburda and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski
Seminal papers recommend that platforms in two-sided markets increase the number of complements available. We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete by limiting the choice of potential matches it offers to its customers while charging higher prices... View Details
Keywords: Matching Platform; Indirect Network Effects; Limits To Network Effects; Decision Choices and Conditions; Network Effects; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Competitive Strategy
Halaburda, Hanna, and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski. "Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-098, May 2010. (Revised June 2010, March 2011, August 2011, March 2013.)
- May 2021
- Article
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (May 2021): 1457–1502.
- Article
Testing Substitutability
By: John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only... View Details
Keywords: Substitutability; Matching; Communication Complexity; Preference Elicitation; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Mathematical Methods; Economics
Hatfield, John William, Nicole Immorlica, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Testing Substitutability." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 639–645.