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- Faculty Publications (129)
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- All HBS Web
(335)
- Faculty Publications (129)
- Article
The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests
By: Hau Chan, David C. Parkes and Karim R. Lakhani
Crowdsourcing platforms operate by offering their clients the ability to obtain cost-effective solutions for their problems through contests. The top contestants with the best solutions are rewarded, and the submitted solutions are provided to the clients. Within the... View Details
Chan, Hau, David C. Parkes, and Karim R. Lakhani. "The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests." Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) 19th (2020): 1795–1797.
- 2021
- Working Paper
Hunting for Talent: Firm-Driven Labor Market Search in the United States
By: Ines Black, Sharique Hasan and Rembrand Koning
This article analyzes the phenomenon of firm-driven labor market search—or outbound recruiting—where recruiters are increasingly “hunting for talent” rather than passively relying on workers to search for and apply to job vacancies. Our research methodology leverages... View Details
Keywords: Hiring; Referrals; Outbound Recruiting; Labor Markets; Selection and Staffing; Networks; Recruitment; Strategy; United States
Black, Ines, Sharique Hasan, and Rembrand Koning. "Hunting for Talent: Firm-Driven Labor Market Search in the United States." SSRN Working Paper Series, No. 3576498, September 2021.
- December 2019
- Article
Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details
Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods
Galichon, Alfred, Scott Duke Kominers, and Simon Weber. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 6 (December 2019): 2875–2925.
- November 2019
- Other Article
Corrigendum to "Multilateral Matching"
By: Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We identify an error in the claim by Hatfield and Kominers (2015) that every stable outcome in the setting of multilateral matching with contracts is efficient. We then show that the result can be recovered under a suitable differentiability condition. View Details
Keywords: Matching; Stability; Competitive Equilibrium; Networks; Joint Ventures; Balance and Stability
Bando, Keisuke, Toshiyuki Hirai, John William Hatfield, and Scott Duke Kominers. Corrigendum to "Multilateral Matching". Art. 104933. Journal of Economic Theory 184 (November 2019).
- July 2019
- Article
Optimal Capital Structure and Bankruptcy Choice: Dynamic Bargaining vs Liquidation
By: Samuel Antill and Steven R. Grenadier
We model a firm’s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either Chapter 11 reorganization or Chapter 7 liquidation. Creditors anticipate equityholders’ ex-post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex-ante... View Details
Keywords: Default; Dynamic Bargaining; Capital Structure; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Mathematical Methods
Antill, Samuel, and Steven R. Grenadier. "Optimal Capital Structure and Bankruptcy Choice: Dynamic Bargaining vs Liquidation." Journal of Financial Economics 133, no. 1 (July 2019): 198–224.
- January 2019
- Article
Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats Through Performance-Based Postings
By: Adnan Q. Khan, Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Benjamin A. Olken
Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship... View Details
Keywords: Serial Dictatorship Mechanism; Employment; Geographic Location; Motivation and Incentives; Performance
Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats Through Performance-Based Postings." American Economic Review 109, no. 1 (January 2019): 237–270.
- 2020
- Working Paper
Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers
By: Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru
This paper studies the impact of the arbitrator selection process on consumer outcomes by examining roughly 9,000 consumer arbitration cases in the securities industry. Securities disputes present a good laboratory: arbitration is mandatory for all disputes,... View Details
Keywords: Arbitration; Financial Advisers; Financial Advisors; Brokers; Consumer Finance; Financial Misconduct; Fraud; Personal Finance; Conflict and Resolution; Information; Fairness
Egan, Mark, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru. "Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-046, October 2018. (Revise and Resubmit at the Review of Economic Studies. Revised May 2020. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 25150, October 2018)
- 2018
- Working Paper
Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts
By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
- 2017
- Working Paper
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-055, January 2018.
- August 2017
- Article
A Formal Theory of Strategy
What makes a decision strategic? When is strategy most important? This paper formally studies these questions, starting from a (functional) definition of strategy as “the smallest set of choices to optimally guide (or force) other choices.” The paper shows that this... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric J. "A Formal Theory of Strategy." Management Science 63, no. 8 (August 2017): 2616–2636.
- 2017
- Chapter
Innovation Policies
By: Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf
Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will start. We demonstrate that failure tolerance has an equilibrium price – in terms of an investor’s... View Details
Keywords: Innovation; Investing; Abandonment Option; Failure Tolerance; Innovation and Invention; Venture Capital; Attitudes; Investment; Failure
Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Innovation Policies." In Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Platforms. Vol. 37, edited by Jeffrey Furman, Annabelle Gawer, Brian Silverman, and Scott Stern, 37–80. Advances in Strategic Management. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017.
- Article
Who Will Vote Quadratically? Voter Turnout and Votes Cast Under Quadratic Voting
By: Louis Kaplow and Scott Duke Kominers
Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core QV literature assumes that everyone votes, turnout is endogenous. Drawing on other work, we consider the representativeness of endogenously... View Details
Keywords: Voting Turnout; Paradox Of Voting; Quadratic Voting; Pivotality; Elections; Voting; Political Elections; Mathematical Methods
Kaplow, Louis, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Who Will Vote Quadratically? Voter Turnout and Votes Cast Under Quadratic Voting." Special Issue on Quadratic Voting and the Public Good. Public Choice 172, nos. 1-2 (July 2017): 125–149.
- 2019
- Chapter
Network Effects
By: Andrei Hagiu and David B. Yoffie
Network effects are a key economic and strategic phenomenon in 'new economy' industries. They can, but do not necessarily, lead to market tipping, unless they outweigh customers' benefits from differentiation and are accompanied by high switching and multi-homing... View Details
Keywords: Network Effects
Hagiu, Andrei, and David B. Yoffie. "Network Effects." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Continuously updated edition, edited by Mie Augier and David J. Teece. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Electronic. (Pre-published, October 2013.)
- May 2017
- Article
Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry
By: William Schmidt and Ryan W. Buell
Operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm's prospects to less-informed parties, such as investors, customers, competitors, and regulators. Consequently, managers in these settings often face a tradeoff between making an optimal decision and... View Details
Keywords: Behavioral Decision Research; Information Asymmetry; Signaling; Decision Choices and Conditions; Alignment
Schmidt, William, and Ryan W. Buell. "Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry." Management Science 63, no. 5 (May 2017): 1586–1605.
- 2016
- Article
Organizational Decision-Making and Information: Angel Investments by Venture Capital Partners
By: Andy Wu
We study information aggregation in organizational decision-making for the financing of entrepreneurial ventures. We introduce a formal model of voting where agents face costly tacit information to improve their decision quality. Equilibrium outcomes suggest a... View Details
Keywords: Entrepreneurial Finance; Angel Investors; Organization Design; Voting; Group Decision-making; Information; Strategy; Organizations; Entrepreneurship; Decision Making; Financing and Loans
Wu, Andy. "Organizational Decision-Making and Information: Angel Investments by Venture Capital Partners." Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings (2016): 189–194.
- July 16, 2016
- Article
A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes
By: Elisabeth C. Paulson, Igor Linkov and Jeffrey Keisler
We study a strategic, two-player, sequential game between an attacker and defender. The defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets. The attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack. This paper proposes... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth C., Igor Linkov, and Jeffrey Keisler. "A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes." European Journal of Operational Research 252, no. 2 (July 16, 2016): 610–622.
- Article
The Cost of Capital for Alternative Investments
By: Jakub W. Jurek and Erik Stafford
Traditional risk factor models indicate that hedge funds capture pre-fee alphas of 6% to 10% per annum over the period from 1996 to 2012. At the same time, the hedge fund return series is not reliably distinguishable from the returns of mechanical S&P 500 put-writing... View Details
Keywords: Hedge Funds; Required Returns; Downside Risk; Index Options; Investment Funds; Cost of Capital; Investment Return; Risk and Uncertainty; Financial Services Industry
Jurek, Jakub W., and Erik Stafford. "The Cost of Capital for Alternative Investments." Journal of Finance 70, no. 5 (October 2015): 2185–2226.
- Article
Multilateral Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Stability; Competitive Equilibrium; Core; Networks; Competition; Joint Ventures; Balance and Stability; Groups and Teams; Entrepreneurship
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Multilateral Matching." Journal of Economic Theory 156 (March 2015): 175–206.
- March 2015
- Article
Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model
By: William Schmidt, Vishal Gaur, Richard Lai and Ananth Raman
We investigate a puzzling phenomenon in which firms make investment decisions that purposefully do not maximize expected profits. Using an extension to the newsvendor model, we focus on a relatively common scenario in which the firm's investor has imperfect information... View Details
Schmidt, William, Vishal Gaur, Richard Lai, and Ananth Raman. "Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 3 (March 2015): 383–401.
- February 2015
- Article
Location Choices under Strategic Interactions
By: Juan Alcacer, Cristian Dezso and Minyuan Zhao
The literature on location choices has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics. However, most industries with a significant presence of multi-location firms are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that strategic interaction among firms... View Details
Keywords: Location Strategies; Multinational Strategy; Oligopolistic Competition; Firm Heterogeneity; Geographic Location; Multinational Firms and Management; Balance and Stability; Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory
Alcacer, Juan, Cristian Dezso, and Minyuan Zhao. "Location Choices under Strategic Interactions." Strategic Management Journal 36, no. 2 (February 2015): 197–215.