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- All HBS Web (303)
- Faculty Publications (114)
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- 2009
- Chapter
Institutional Work and the Paradox of Embedded Agency
By: Julie Battilana and Thomas D'Aunno
Battilana, Julie, and Thomas D'Aunno. "Institutional Work and the Paradox of Embedded Agency." In Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of Organizations, edited by T. Lawrence, R. Suddaby, and B. Leca, 31–58. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- 31 Aug 2009
- Research & Ideas
Why Competition May Not Improve Credit Rating Agencies
In the run-up to the global financial crisis, credit rating agencies gave high marks to such risky financial vehicles as collateralized debt obligations, which few people understood. It has been argued that these ratings misled investors... View Details
- 09 Oct 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency
- February 2009
- Article
Suspended in Self-Spun Webs of Significance: A Rhetorical Model of Institutionalization and Institutionally Embedded Agency
By: Sandy Edward Green, Yuan Li and Nitin Nohria
This article employs rhetorical theory to reconceptualize institutionalization as change in argument structure. As a state, institutionalization is embodied in the structure of argument used to justify a practice at a given point in time. As a process,... View Details
Green, Sandy Edward, Yuan Li, and Nitin Nohria. "Suspended in Self-Spun Webs of Significance: A Rhetorical Model of Institutionalization and Institutionally Embedded Agency." Academy of Management Journal 52, no. 1 (February 2009): 11–36.
- Article
Neither a Bazaar nor a Cathedral: The Interplay between Structure and Agency in Wikipedia's Role System.
By: Ofer Arazy, Hila Lifshitz - Assaf and Adam Balila
Roles provide a key coordination mechanism in peer-production. Whereas one stream in the literature has focused on the structural responsibilities associated with roles, the another has stressed the emergent nature of work. To date, these streams have proceeded largely... View Details
Arazy, Ofer, Hila Lifshitz - Assaf, and Adam Balila. "Neither a Bazaar nor a Cathedral: The Interplay between Structure and Agency in Wikipedia's Role System." Art. 1. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 70, no. 1 (January 2019): 3–15.
- March 2017
- Article
Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence
By: Mozaffar N. Khan, Suraj Srinivasan and Liang Tan
We provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Chen and Chu, 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index... View Details
Keywords: Tax Avoidance; Agency Costs; Institutional Ownership; Private Ownership; Crime and Corruption; Taxation; Agency Theory
Khan, Mozaffar N., Suraj Srinivasan, and Liang Tan. "Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence." Accounting Review 92, no. 2 (March 2017): 101–122.
- 2014
- Article
The Governance of Social Enterprises: Mission Drift and Accountability Challenges in Hybrid Organizations
By: Alnoor Ebrahim, Julie Battilana and Johanna Mair
We examine the challenges of governance facing organizations that pursue a social mission through the use of market mechanisms. These hybrid organizations, often referred to as social enterprises, combine aspects of both charity and business at their core. In this... View Details
Keywords: Governance; Hybrid Organizations; Nonprofit; Performance Measurement; Legal Form; Agency Theory; Stakeholder Management; Mission and Purpose; Social Enterprise; Corporate Accountability
Ebrahim, Alnoor, Julie Battilana, and Johanna Mair. "The Governance of Social Enterprises: Mission Drift and Accountability Challenges in Hybrid Organizations." Research in Organizational Behavior 34 (2014): 81–100.
- 2019
- Working Paper
Self-Interest: The Economist's Straitjacket
By: Robert Simons
This paper examines contemporary economic theories that focus on the design and management of business organizations. In the first part of the paper, a taxonomy is presented that describes the different types of economists interested in this subject—market economists,... View Details
Keywords: Self-interest; Economist; Moral Philosophers; Regulation; Capture; Organization Design; Economy Theory; Organization Theory; Management Theory; Commitment; Controls; Governance; Customers; Conflict of Interests; Business or Company Management; Competition; Organizational Design; Business Education; Agency Theory; Economics; Theory; Boundaries
Simons, Robert. "Self-Interest: The Economist's Straitjacket." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-045, October 2015. (Revised January 2019.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Beyond Agency Theory: The Hidden and Heretofore Inaccessible Power of Integrity (PDF file of Keynote Slides)
By: Michael C. Jensen and Werner Erhard
There is far too much concern today about the conflicts of interest between people; for example, conflicts of interest between agents and owners—historically a favorite topic of Jensen—and not enough attention paid to the damage caused by an individual's conflict of... View Details
- May 2021
- Case
The International Space Station, Principal-Agent Problems, and NASA's Quest to Keep Humans in Space
By: Matthew Weinzierl and Mehak Sarang
In building the International Space Station (ISS), NASA opened the door to the development of a robust in-space economy in low-Earth Orbit, and yet the decision to build the station, and continue to extend its lifetime, placed a huge burden on NASA’s Human Spaceflight... View Details
Keywords: Aerospace; Nasa; Space Economy; Principal-agent Theory; Policy; Commercialization; Aerospace Industry
Weinzierl, Matthew, and Mehak Sarang. "The International Space Station, Principal-Agent Problems, and NASA's Quest to Keep Humans in Space." Harvard Business School Case 721-054, May 2021.
- 2014
- Book
Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond
By: Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini
In this book we describe the transformation of state capitalism from a model in which governments owned and ran corporations and broadly controlled the allocation of financial resources into two new varieties of state capitalism: Leviathan as a majority and as a... View Details
Keywords: State Capitalism; State-owned Enterprises; Industrial Policy; Development Banks; Capitalism; Financial Markets; Corporate Governance Theory; CEO Effects; Public Sector; Economic Systems; Financial Institutions; Corporate Governance; Business and Government Relations; Governing and Advisory Boards; State Ownership; Privatization; Public Ownership; Emerging Markets; Banking Industry; Mining Industry; Energy Industry
Musacchio, Aldo, and Sergio G. Lazzarini. Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
- March 2023
- Article
Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.
In many... View Details
In many... View Details
Keywords: Antitrust; Antitrust Law; Antitrust Theory; Law And Economics; Collusion; Collaboration; Collaborative Industries; Regulation; "Repeated Games"; IPOs; Initial Public Offerings; Underwriters; Real Estate; Real Estate Agents; Realtors; Syndicated Markets; Syndication; Brokers; Market Concentration; Competition; Law; Economics; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Game Theory; Initial Public Offering
Barry, Jordan M., John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries." Iowa Law Review 108, no. 3 (March 2023): 1089–1148.
- October 2010
- Background Note
Family Corporate Governance: A Brief Literature Review
By: Lena G. Goldberg and David Kiron
This note discusses competing theories of governance in family owned firms and focuses on agency theory, stewardship theory, and the sociological concept of embeddedness. View Details
Keywords: Family Business; Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Managerial Roles; Family Ownership; Theory
Goldberg, Lena G., and David Kiron. "Family Corporate Governance: A Brief Literature Review." Harvard Business School Background Note 311-055, October 2010.
- January 2015
- Article
Are Incentives Without Expertise Sufficient? Evidence from Fortune 500 Firms
By: Emilie R. Feldman and Cynthia A. Montgomery
Agency theory predicts that incentives will align agents' interests with those of principals. However, the resource-based view suggests that to be effective, the incentive to deliver must be paired with the ability to deliver. Using Fortune 500 boards as an... View Details
Keywords: Board Of Directors; Corporate Governance; Incentives; Expertise; Motivation and Incentives; Governing and Advisory Boards; Experience and Expertise; Agency Theory
Feldman, Emilie R., and Cynthia A. Montgomery. "Are Incentives Without Expertise Sufficient? Evidence from Fortune 500 Firms." Strategic Management Journal 36, no. 1 (January 2015): 113–122.
- Fall 2013
- Article
In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms
By: Mariana Pargendler, Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini
A large legal and economic literature describes how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer from a variety of agency and political problems. Less theory and evidence, however, have been generated about the reasons why state-owned enterprises listed in stock markets... View Details
Keywords: State-owned Enterprises; Oil Companies; Corporate Governance; Business and Shareholder Relations; Energy Industry; Brazil; Mexico; Norway
Pargendler, Mariana, Aldo Musacchio, and Sergio G. Lazzarini. "In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms." Cornell International Law Journal 46, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 569–610.
- 09 Apr 2012
- Research & Ideas
Who Sways the USDA on GMO Approvals?
it's less clear how companies sway the regulatory agencies that enforce them, which are more isolated from the direct effects of money or persuasion. “If a company can get enough farmers to support the product and they write letters, then... View Details
- August 2008
- Article
The Implications of Unverifiable Fair-value Accounting: Evidence from the Political Economy of Goodwill Accounting
By: Karthik Ramanna
I study the evolution of SFAS 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the FASB issuing SFAS 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting. The result is... View Details
Keywords: Accounting; Fair Values; Politics; Standard Setting; Fair Value Accounting; Goodwill Accounting; Government Legislation; Agency Theory
Ramanna, Karthik. "The Implications of Unverifiable Fair-value Accounting: Evidence from the Political Economy of Goodwill Accounting." Journal of Accounting & Economics 45, nos. 2-3 (August 2008): 253–281. (Winner of the Elsevier JAE 2008 Best Paper Prize. Winner of the American Accounting Association FARS Best Dissertation Award. Presented at the 2006 Journal of Accounting & Economics Conference.)
- Research Summary
Overview
By: Tatiana Sandino
In studying management control systems, Professor Sandino aims to understand how different control mechanisms can help lead employees within an organization to achieve common goals. Her work builds on contingency theory by exploring environmental, strategic, and... View Details
- Forthcoming
- Article
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate Agents; Real Estate; Realtors; Broker Networks; Brokerage; Brokerage Commissions; "Brokerage Industry; Brokered Markets; Brokering; Brokers; Industrial Organization; Repeated Game Framework; "Repeated Games"; Collusion; Antitrust; Microeconomics; Market Design; Theory; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
- 28 Dec 2010
- Working Paper Summaries