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Takeover Defenses
Where can I find information on public companies that have instituted takeover defenses such as poison pills? Capital IQ allows you to screen for companies with takeover View Details
- fall 2005
- Article
Takeover Defenses and Bargaining Power
Subramanian, Guhan. "Takeover Defenses and Bargaining Power." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 17, no. 4 (fall 2005).
- March 1982
- Background Note
Note on Hostile Takeover Bid Defense Strategies
Law, Warren A., and Charles Thierry. "Note on Hostile Takeover Bid Defense Strategies." Harvard Business School Background Note 282-065, March 1982.
- December 2003
- Article
Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses
Subramanian, Guhan. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses." Yale Law Journal 113, no. 3 (December 2003). (Selected by academics as one of the "top ten" articles in corporate/securities law for 2004, out of 439 articles published in that year.)
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Castle Rock Management
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Castle Rock Management." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-012, July 2015.
- 1999
- Discussion Paper
The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses
By: John C. Coates
Coates, John C. "The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses." Discussion Paper Series, Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, 1999. (No. 265.)
- Article
The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses
By: John C. Coates
Coates, John C. "The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses." Texas Law Review 79 (2000): 271.
- 2010
- Other Unpublished Work
Why Takeover Vulnerability Matters to Debtholders
By: Joan Farre-Mensa
Recent work documents that firms that are more vulnerable to takeover have higher borrowing costs. This paper investigates the reasons behind this stylized fact. My results show that firms with few antitakeover defenses face a higher cost of debt because lenders are... View Details
Keywords: Acquisition; Borrowing and Debt; Cost; Equity; Banks and Banking; Investment Portfolio; Risk Management; Agreements and Arrangements; Business and Shareholder Relations; Conflict and Resolution
Farre-Mensa, Joan. "Why Takeover Vulnerability Matters to Debtholders." 2010.
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Remingtons Housewares
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Remingtons Housewares." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-014, July 2015.
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Fultons Department Stores
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Fultons Department Stores." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-013, July 2015.
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Castle Rock-Fultons-Remingtons
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Castle Rock-Fultons-Remingtons." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-011, July 2015.
- December 2000
- Article
Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence
By: John C. Coates
Coates, John C. "Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence." Texas Law Review 79, no. 2 (December 2000): 271–382.
- June 1998
- Article
A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill
Subramanian, Guhan. "A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill." Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 23, no. 2 (June 1998).
- September 2017
- Article
Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value
By: Charles C.Y. Wang and Alma Cohen
Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not... View Details
Keywords: Staggered Boards; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Firm Value; Delaware; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Corporate Governance; Value
Wang, Charles C.Y., and Alma Cohen. "Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value." Journal of Financial Economics 125, no. 3 (September 2017): 637–647.
- November 2017
- Case
Third Point Paints a Target on Sotheby's
By: Lena G. Goldberg
When faced with the increasing accumulation of its stock by activist investors led by Daniel Loeb’s Third Point LLC and the activists’ stated objective to replace management and at least some Sotheby’s Board members, Sotheby’s, the world’s oldest auction house,... View Details
Keywords: Fiduciary Duties; Activists; Activist Investors; Rights Plan; Poison Pills; Takeover Defenses; Corporate Governance; Laws and Statutes; Lawsuits and Litigation; Ownership Stake; Value Creation; Crisis Management
Goldberg, Lena G. "Third Point Paints a Target on Sotheby's." Harvard Business School Case 318-086, November 2017.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
In a paper published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2013, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be on average value-reducing. In a recent response paper, Amihud and Stoyanov (2015) “contest” our results. They... View Details
Keywords: Staggered Boards; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Firm Value; Agency Costs; Delaware; Chancery Court; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Acquisition; Corporate Governance; Business and Shareholder Relations; Delaware
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-097, February 2016.
- January 2016 (Revised January 2019)
- Supplement
The Allergan Board Under Fire (B)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates and David Lane
In 2014, the Allergan Inc. board of directors received a surprise takeover offer from Valeant Pharmaceuticals in alliance with hedge fund activist Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management. In the unprecedented arrangement between an acquirer and a hedge fund... View Details
Keywords: Allergan, Inc.; Valeant; Ackman; Pershing Square; Tender Offer; Activist Investors; Business Models; R＆D; Board Of Directors; Securities Litigation; Acquisition Strategy; Takeover Defenses; Hedge Funds; Shareholder Rights; Proxy Contest; Shareholder Special Meetings; Legal Issues In Contested Takeovers; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Business and Stakeholder Relations; Business Model; Business and Shareholder Relations; Valuation; Pharmaceutical Industry
Paine, Lynn S., Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates, and David Lane. "The Allergan Board Under Fire (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 316-029, January 2016. (Revised January 2019.)
- December 2013
- Article
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment... View Details
Keywords: Staggered Board; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Proxy Fight; Tobin's; Firm Value; Agency Cost; Delaware; Chancery Court; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Corporate Governance
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 627–641.
- January 2016 (Revised January 2019)
- Case
The Allergan Board Under Fire (A)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates and David Lane
In 2014, the Allergan Inc. board of directors received a surprise takeover offer from Valeant Pharmaceuticals in alliance with hedge fund activist Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management. In the unprecedented arrangement between an acquirer and a hedge fund... View Details
Keywords: Allergan, Inc.; Valeant; Ackman; Pershing Square; Tender Offer; Activist Investors; Business Models; R＆D; Board Of Directors; Securities Litigation; Acquisition Strategy; Takeover Defenses; Hedge Funds; Shareholder Rights; Proxy Contest; Shareholder Special Meetings; Legal Issues In Contested Takeovers; Governing and Advisory Boards; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Management Teams; Business and Shareholder Relations; Pharmaceutical Industry
Paine, Lynn S., Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates, and David Lane. "The Allergan Board Under Fire (A)." Harvard Business School Case 316-010, January 2016. (Revised January 2019.)