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- All HBS Web
(1,618)
- People (1)
- News (326)
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- Faculty Publications (571)
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- Article
Multilateral Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Stability; Competitive Equilibrium; Core; Networks; Competition; Joint Ventures; Balance and Stability; Groups and Teams; Entrepreneurship
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Multilateral Matching." Journal of Economic Theory 156 (March 2015): 175–206.
- October 2023
- Article
Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
By: David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of... View Details
Keywords: Refugee Resettlement; Matching; Matching Markets; Matching Platform; Matching With Contracts; Algorithms; Refugees; Market Design
Delacrétaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement." American Economic Review 113, no. 10 (October 2023): 2689–2717.
- November 2020
- Article
Taxation in Matching Markets
By: Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe and Scott Duke Kominers
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e., markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom,... View Details
Dupuy, Arnaud, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Taxation in Matching Markets." International Economic Review 61, no. 4 (November 2020): 1591–1634.
- August 2019
- Article
Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 2019): 191–224.
- Article
Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Matching; Cheap Talk; Congestion; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Job Search
Coles, Peter A., Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (May 2013): 99–134.
- Article
Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations
By: Lalin Anik, Michael I. Norton and Dan Ariely
We propose a new means by which non-profits can induce donors to give today and commit to giving in the future: contingent match incentives, in which matching is made contingent on the percentage of others who give (e.g., "if X% of others give, we will match all... View Details
Keywords: Matching Donations; Social Proof; Prosocial Behavior; Charitable Giving; Plausibility; Motivation and Incentives; Philanthropy and Charitable Giving
Anik, Lalin, Michael I. Norton, and Dan Ariely. "Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations." Journal of Marketing Research (JMR) 51, no. 6 (December 2014): 790–801.
- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum
By: John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan and Scott Duke Kominers
Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Ravi Jagadeesan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 3 (August 2020): 277–285.
- May 2016
- Article
Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Airline Seat Upgrades; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Tayfun Sönmez. "Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory." Theoretical Economics 11, no. 2 (May 2016): 683–710.
- 2018
- Working Paper
Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts
By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
- Article
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
Kominers, Scott Duke. "On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 984–989.
- 2020
- Working Paper
No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
How do firms pair workers with managers, and which constraints affect the allocation of labor within the firm? We characterize the sorting pattern of managers to workers in a large readymade garment manufacturer in India and then explore potential drivers of the... View Details
Keywords: Assortative Matching; Productivity; Global Buyers; Readymade Garments; Management; Employees; Performance Productivity
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-103, March 2020.
- Article
Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem; Mechanism Design; Marketplace Matching
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 287–294.
- Article
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
This note surveys recent work in generalized matching theory, focusing on trading networks with transferable utility. In trading networks with a finite set of contractual opportunities, the substitutability of agents’ preferences is essential for the guaranteed... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Networks; Joint Ventures; Stability; Competitive Equilibrium; Core; Efficiency; Economics; Theory
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers." ACM SIGecom Exchanges 10, no. 3 (December 2011).
- March 2010
- Article
Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching
In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues" is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, "matching without preferences over colleagues." We give an explicit reduction... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 68, no. 2 (March 2010): 773–780.
- Forthcoming
- Article
No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
How do firms pair workers with managers, and which constraints affect the allocation of labor within the firm? We characterize the sorting pattern of managers to workers in a large readymade garment manufacturer in India and then explore potential drivers of the... View Details
- December 2019
- Article
Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details
Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods
Galichon, Alfred, Scott Duke Kominers, and Simon Weber. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 6 (December 2019): 2875–2925.
- March 2018 (Revised August 2018)
- Case
Matching Markets for Googlers
By: Bo Cowgill and Rembrand Koning
This case describes how Google designed and launched an internal matching market to assign individual workers with projects and managers. The case evaluates how marketplace design considerations—and several alternative staffing models—could affect the company’s goals... View Details
Keywords: People Analytics; Google; Labor Market; Staffing; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Goals and Objectives; Technology Industry; United States
Cowgill, Bo, and Rembrand Koning. "Matching Markets for Googlers." Harvard Business School Case 718-487, March 2018. (Revised August 2018.) (More about Bo Cowgill.)
- June 1999
- Case
Matching Dell (A)
By: Jan W. Rivkin, Michael E. Porter, Charles E. Bruin, Markus Chappel, Thomas M Galizia and Laila J Worrell
After years of success with its vaunted "Direct Model" for computer manufacturing, marketing, and distribution, Dell Computer Corp. faces efforts by competitors to match its strategy. This case describes the evolution of the personal computer industry, Dell's strategy,... View Details
Rivkin, Jan W., Michael E. Porter, Charles E. Bruin, Markus Chappel, Thomas M Galizia, and Laila J Worrell. "Matching Dell (A)." Harvard Business School Case 799-158, June 1999.
- 30 May 2013
- Working Paper Summaries