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All HBS Web
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- Research (8)
- Faculty Publications (5)
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- Article
Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf...
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Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 275–286.
- August 2020
- Article
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any...
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Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Social Choice and Welfare 55, no. 2 (August 2020): 215–228.
- 2017
- Working Paper
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any...
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Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-055, January 2018.
- 19 Mar 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
- Article
Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided...
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Keywords:
Matching;
Strategy-proofness;
Lone Wolf Theorem;
Rural Hospitals Theorem;
Mechanism Design;
Marketplace Matching
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 287–294.
- February 2005
- Article
Managing the Ecosystem
By: Marco Iansiti
The days of the corporate lone wolf are over. In our increasingly interconnected world, standing alone is no longer a viable business model. Instead, smart companies rely heavily on networks of partners, suppliers, and customers to achieve market success and sustain...
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Keywords:
Integrated Corporate Reporting;
Partners and Partnerships;
Industry Clusters;
Customers;
Markets;
Situation or Environment;
Banks and Banking;
Insurance;
Software
Iansiti, Marco. "Managing the Ecosystem." Optimize 4, no. 2 (February 2005).
- 07 Feb 2007
- Research & Ideas
Dividends from Schumpeter’s Noble Failure
chapters in seminars. That so enormous an achievement was the product of lonely research tells what a great scholar Schumpeter was."4 The design of Business Cycles—a three-country study of the United States, Britain, and Germany,...
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by Thomas K. McCraw
- 16 Jan 2018
- First Look
First Look at New Research and Ideas, January 16, 2018
explores whether the strategy will save the Chinese economy or generate social and political problems that imperil the country's growth and stability. Publisher's link: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=53716 Lone Wolves in...
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Keywords:
Sean Silverthorne